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STATE OF WEST BENGAL V. COMMITTEE FOR
PROTECTION OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS:

A

CRITIQUE
P.P. Rao'

ABSTRACT
Can a High Court in exercise of its writjurisdictiondirect the CBI to investigate
offences alleged to have taken place within the territorialjurisdiction of a
State without the consent of the State Government - this is the legal question
that this article considers. Analyzing the implications of the recent decision
of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection
of Democratic Rights on this issue, this paper makes a case againstjudicial
interference in these matters, arguingthat the court's role must be confined to
examining whether the state government's refusal to order investigation was
arbitraryor not.
One of the important decisions by a Constitution Bench last year was in
State of West Bengal v. Committeefor Protectionof Democratic Rights.' The question
involved is, whether a High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India can direct the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)
established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, to investigate
cognizable offence which is alleged to have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of a State without the consent of the State Government? The question
assumed significance on account of the involvement of two basic features of the
Constitution, namely, the federal structure and the power of judicial review. Entry
80 in List Iof Schedule VII to the Constitution of India reads: "Extension of the powers
and jurisdictionof members of a policeforce belonging to any State to any area outside that
State, but not so as to enable the police of one State to exercise powers and jurisdiction in
any area outside that State without the consent of the Government of the State in which
such area is situated...". The crucial words in this Entry are "but not so as to enable
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the police of one State to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area outside that State
without the consent of the Government of the State in which such area is situated". Entry
80 in the Union List corresponds to Entry 39 of List I of Federal Legislative List in
the VII Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. The wording is identical,
except that the Entry referred to "British India", "Governor's Province" and "Chief
Commissioner's Province", while Entry 80 in the Constitution refers to "State" and
"Government of the State".
The CBI is constituted by the Central Government under the Delhi Special
Police Establishment Act, 1946. 'Police' is a State subject- Entry 2 of List II. Section
2 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 provides for constitution of
a special police force, to be called the Delhi Special Police Establishment, by the
Central Government for investigation in any Union Territory of offences notified
in Section 3 of the said Act. Section 5(1) says that the Central Government may
by order extend to any area in a State not being a Union Territory, the powers
and jurisdiction of the members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment for the
investigation of any offence or class of offences specified in the notification issued
under Section 3 of the Act. Section 3 requires the Central Government to specify
the offences or class of offences which are to be investigated by the Delhi Special
Police Establishment. However, Section 6 requires consent of the State Government
concerned to permit investigation of any offence within its territory by any member
of the Delhi Special Police Establishment. It reads: "Nothing contained in Section 5
shall be deemed to enable any member of the Delhi Special Police Establishmentto exercise
powers and jurisdiction in any area in a State, not being a Union Territory or Railway
area, without the consent of the Government of that State." This pre-Constitution
requirement of consent is incorporated in the Constitution of India in Entry 80 of
List I. It follows that the consent of the State Government of the State concerned is
a condition precedent to be satisfied before calling upon the CBI to investigate any
offence in that State. This condition is consistent with the federal structure of the
Constitution, which ensures autonomy for each State, in the matter of legislation
and executive action.
In State of West Bengal v. Sampat Lal,2 the Supreme Court took the view that
Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act does not apply when the
court gives a direction to the CBI to conduct an investigation, and observed that
the counsel for the parties rightly did not dispute this position. It was just an
undisputed assumption but not a declaration of law made after contest. However
in the facts of that case, the court held that it was not necessary to take away the
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investigation from the hands of the State police machinery, which is a statutory
agency, but suggested that the Director General of Police, West Bengal, should
appoint a competent supervisory officer from the higher ranks of the State police
to supervise the investigation in the case on hand. The Court reiterated the view
taken by the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad3 that the functions
of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping.
On March 10, 1989 in Haryana Mahila Sangathanv. Union of India,4 a Bench of
two Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court referred to the Constitution Bench the
following question:
Whether a court can order the Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI), an establishment created under the Delhi Special Police Act to
investigate a cognizable offence which is alleged to have taken place
in a State without the consent of the State Government and without
any notification or order having been issued by the State Government
conferring powers on the CBI to investigate any case in the State?
However, the case was finally disposed of without deciding the question.
In a few cases, Benches of two Hon'ble Judges each relied on Article 142 of the
Constitution as the source of power for directing investigation by the CBI in any
State without the consent of the State Government concerned.? Article 142 of the
Constitution empowers the Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in
any cause or matter pending before it. However, such a power is not conferred on
High Courts as held by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar4
and Sanchalakshmi v. Vijaykumar RaghuvirprasadMehta.7 In State of West Bengal v.
Committee Jir Protection of Democratic Rights, W.B.,8 a Bench of two Judges, once
again referred the question: Whether a court can order the Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI), an establishment created under the Delhi Special Police

3
4
5
6
7
8

King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (1944) LR 71 [Privy Council].
Haryana Mahila Sangathan v. Union of India, Writ Petition Nos. 531-36 of 1988 [Supreme
Court of India].
Maniyeri Madhavan v. Sub Inspector of Police (1994) 1 SCC 536,540,19, Mohammed
Anis v. UOI (1994) Supp. 1 SCC 145 [Supreme Court of India].
State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar (1992) 1 SCC 489,492 [Supreme Court of India].
Sanchalakshmi v. Vijaykumar Raghuvirprasad Mehta (1998) 8 SCC 245,249 [Supreme
Court of India].
State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, W.B. (2006)12
CC 534 [Supreme Court of Indial.

State of West Bengal v.Committee for Protectionof Democratic Rights: A Critique
Establishment Act, 1946, to investigate a cognizable offence which is alleged to
have taken place in a State without the consent of that State Goverrment on the face
of statutory limitations". In the order of reference, the Bench referred to relevant
entries in the Government of India Act, 1935 and in Entry 80 of List I as well as
Entries 2 and 2A of List II of the Constitution, besides the provisions of theDelhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and the statutory limitations mentioned in
Sections 5(2) and 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. Finally, the
Constitution Bench has since declared the law as follows: (i) The fundamental right,
enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, area inherent and cannot be extinguished
by any constitutional or statutory provision, (ii) The State has a duty to enforce the
human rights of a citizen providing for fair and impartial investigation against
any person accused of commission of a cognizable offence, which may include
its own officers, (iii) In view of the constitutional scheme and the jurisdiction
conferred on this Court under Article 32 and on the High Courts under Article
226 of the Constitution the power of judicial review being an integral part of the
basic structure of the Constitution, no Act of Parliament can exclude or curtail the
powers of the constitutional courts with regard to the enforcement of fundamental
rights, (iv) any direction by the Supreme Court or the High Court in exercise of
power under Article 32 or 226 to uphold the Constitution and maintain the rule
of law cannot be termed as violating the federal structure and (v) Restriction on
Parliament by the Constitution and restriction on the executive by Parliament
under the enactment, do not amount to restriction on the power of the judiciary
under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. In other words, the Constitution
Bench answered the question referred to it by holding that a direction by the
High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution,
to CBI to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within
the territory of a State without the consent of the Government of that State will
neither impinge upon the federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the
doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law. The Constitution Bench
reiterated the view taken in Minor Irrigation& Rural Engg. Services, U.P. v. Sahngoo
Ram Arya 9 that before directing an inquiry by CBI, the High Court should come to a
conclusion after considering the material on record that the material does disclose
a prima facie case calling for an investigation by CBI or any other similar agency.
The question that arises for consideration is: whether the power of judicial
review can be exercised disregarding the constitutional limitation incorporated in
Entry 80 of List I in Schedule VII of the Constitution? The requirement of consent
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of the State Government for entrusting investigation of a cognizable offence in the
State by the CBI or any other external agency was intended to safeguard the federal
structure of the Constitution which is also a basic feature. The question whether
Article 142 empowers the Supreme Court to pass an order contrary to a substantive
provisions of a Statute was answered in the negative by successive Constitution
Benches.' 0 The view taken was that however wide and plenary language of Article
142 maybe, the direction given by the Court should not be inconsistent with or
repugnant to or in violation of a substantive provision of any statute. This being
the settled law, can a direction which is plainly inconsistent with a provision of
the Constitution be issued?
The next question which deserves consideration is: when there is need to
entrust investigation of a cognizable offence in a State to the CBI or any other
external investigating agency in a given case because investigation by the State
police cannot be expected to be objective or independent in a case when, for
instance, the chief minister of the State is the accused should the High Courts and
the Supreme Court be powerless to direct such investigation without the consent
of the State Government?
It is possible to observe the constitutional limitation set out in Entry 80 of
List I of Schedule VII and Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act,
1946 by the Court first seeking the consent of the State Government concerned for
such investigation by an outside agency and in the case of the State Government
unreasonably refusing to give its consent, the High Court or the Supreme Court,
as the case may be, may interfere on the ground that the decision of the State
Government not to permit investigation by the CBI or any other independent
agency as the case maybe, was unreasonable and arbitrary and then issue a direction
for investigation by CB. It is now well settled by Maneka Gandhiv. Union of India'I
that every power of the State has to be exercised reasonably and every exercise of
power can be tested on the anvil of Article 14 to find out whether it is just, reasonable
and fair or arbitrary. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the refusal on the
part of the State Government to give consent to investigation by the CBI in a given
case is arbitrary, then and only then, the court may direct investigation by the CBI
in which case it would be enforcing the right to equality conferred on all persons
by Article 14 of the Constitution.
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